Roberto Mordacci
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty Member
- I am a moral philosopher. My present research fields are the ethics and politics of respect and the philosophy of his... moreI am a moral philosopher. My present research fields are the ethics and politics of respect and the philosophy of history (neo-modernism, utopia). I used to do research in bioethics.edit
Back to Realism. George Edward Moore and Neo-Intuitionism Metaethics in the twentieth century has been heavily influenced by G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, mainly as a reaction to his version of moral realism. The idea of unanalysable... more
Back to Realism. George Edward Moore and Neo-Intuitionism
Metaethics in the twentieth century has been heavily influenced by G.E. Moore’s
Principia Ethica, mainly as a reaction to his version of moral realism. The idea of
unanalysable moral properties has been repeatedly criticized and yet a number
of authors in the recent literature have proposed new versions of a kind of moral
realism inspired by Moore’s perspective. These ideas are discussed here, pointing
out that they all share a return to realism but that they still offer a rather «passive»
account of practical reason. The present resurgence of neo-intuitionism seems
interesting as a development of Moore’s ideas but still unable to face the challenge
of moral realism.
Metaethics in the twentieth century has been heavily influenced by G.E. Moore’s
Principia Ethica, mainly as a reaction to his version of moral realism. The idea of
unanalysable moral properties has been repeatedly criticized and yet a number
of authors in the recent literature have proposed new versions of a kind of moral
realism inspired by Moore’s perspective. These ideas are discussed here, pointing
out that they all share a return to realism but that they still offer a rather «passive»
account of practical reason. The present resurgence of neo-intuitionism seems
interesting as a development of Moore’s ideas but still unable to face the challenge
of moral realism.
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This essay argues that the goal of corporate entrepreneurship is to create value. This is to be understood according to three distinct meanings: economic, productive and social value. Together, the three dimensions of value constitute the... more
This essay argues that the goal of corporate entrepreneurship is to create value. This is to be understood according to three distinct meanings: economic, productive and social value. Together, the three dimensions of value constitute the identity of the corporation, whoch is paramount to its success.
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In a comparative analysis of the merits of Kantianism vs Thomism, I argue that the image of practical reason is stronger in the former and that it avoids some shortcomings of the latter
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In questo contributo cerco di chiarire in quale senso un’etica di ispirazione kantiana possa fare appello a un certo significato di «natura» come fondamento della normatività morale. Intendo questo obiettivo non come una nuova esegesi... more
In questo contributo cerco di chiarire in quale senso un’etica di ispirazione kantiana possa fare appello a un certo significato di «natura» come fondamento della normatività morale. Intendo questo obiettivo non come una nuova esegesi della dottrina di Kant (vi sono interpretazioni esegetiche che vanno in questo senso, comunque), bensì come un tentativo di elaborare una posizione teorica che condivide con Kant anzitutto il primato della ragion pratica.
Per fare questo prendo le distanze da alcune delle interpretazioni recenti dell’etica kantiana e al tempo stesso provo a chiarire la differenza fra questo appello alla natura e, rispettivamente, il «naturalismo etico» contemporaneo e il naturalismo classico di ispirazione aristotelico-scolastica. Illustro poi la struttura essenziale del «realismo della ragion pratica come libertà», che ritengo sia il perno della prospettiva kantiana in etica. Indico le ragioni per cui un’interpretazione realista sia della ragion pratica sia della libertà siano preferibili alle alternative antirealiste. Sposto quindi il punto focale dell’argomentazione sul problema della realtà della libertà, richiamando l’argomento kantiano del Faktum der Vernunft e altri argomenti a favore dell’esistenza reale della libertà. Infine, indico in che senso il realismo della ragion pratica apre la possibilità di riconoscere la variabilità delle tradizioni morali contingenti senza perdere di vista un criterio trascendentale che consente di esprimere un giudizio critico dall’interno di ciascuna tradizione morale.
Per fare questo prendo le distanze da alcune delle interpretazioni recenti dell’etica kantiana e al tempo stesso provo a chiarire la differenza fra questo appello alla natura e, rispettivamente, il «naturalismo etico» contemporaneo e il naturalismo classico di ispirazione aristotelico-scolastica. Illustro poi la struttura essenziale del «realismo della ragion pratica come libertà», che ritengo sia il perno della prospettiva kantiana in etica. Indico le ragioni per cui un’interpretazione realista sia della ragion pratica sia della libertà siano preferibili alle alternative antirealiste. Sposto quindi il punto focale dell’argomentazione sul problema della realtà della libertà, richiamando l’argomento kantiano del Faktum der Vernunft e altri argomenti a favore dell’esistenza reale della libertà. Infine, indico in che senso il realismo della ragion pratica apre la possibilità di riconoscere la variabilità delle tradizioni morali contingenti senza perdere di vista un criterio trascendentale che consente di esprimere un giudizio critico dall’interno di ciascuna tradizione morale.
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Información del artículo L'ambiguo fascino dell'autorità.
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Thus infants and PVS patients, among others, have no moral standing when it comes to euthanasia. Harris' resolution of the euthanasia problem is simple, not to say simplistic. A reviewer's condemnation of such a perspective... more
Thus infants and PVS patients, among others, have no moral standing when it comes to euthanasia. Harris' resolution of the euthanasia problem is simple, not to say simplistic. A reviewer's condemnation of such a perspective would be more pressing were one to take it seriously ...
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There has been a real Kant-Renaissance starting from the 1960s, especially regarding Kant's ethics. In particular, a raised interest in Kant's normative ethics , rather than just in the foundations, has generated not only a number of... more
There has been a real Kant-Renaissance starting from the 1960s, especially regarding Kant's ethics. In particular, a raised interest in Kant's normative ethics , rather than just in the foundations, has generated not only a number of interesting interpretations but various new perspectives inspired by Kant's approach to practical reason, motivation, normativity and freedom. The paper illustrates this debate and deals with some problems which have been detected in Kant's theory by the interpreters.
Research Interests: Ethics, Normative Ethics, Normativity, Immanuel Kant, Moral Philosophy, and 9 moreJohn Rawls, Kant's Ethics, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O'Neill, Normativity, Morality, and Agency, And, Especially, the Intersection Between Those Three. More Recently Epistemology, And, From the Distance, Metaphysics., Kantismo, Kant's Meta ethics, Henry E. Allison, and Kant's Metaphysics of Morals
In this paper I want to show how Bernard Williams contributed, especially with his 'turn' in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, to overcoming the dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy, creating a style of reflection in... more
In this paper I want to show how Bernard Williams contributed, especially with his 'turn' in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, to overcoming the dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy, creating a style of reflection in which conceptual analysis is deeply connected with historical awareness. The idea of genealogy, taken from Nietzsche but heavily modified by Williams, then emerged in books such as Shame and Necessity and Truth and Truthfulness, as an efficacious method for reflection in theoretical and practical philosophy.
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Life-extending technologies pose a serious conceptual and moral problem to our idea of justice between the generations. We need to introduce the notion of normal opportunity range and be more flexible as to the application of equality... more
Life-extending technologies pose a serious conceptual and moral problem to our idea of justice between the generations. We need to introduce the notion of normal opportunity range and be more flexible as to the application of equality among the age groups
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Thomists and Kantians usually ignore each other. And between Thomistic ethics and Kantian ethics there is the vast land of Metaphysics which divides them: what for Thomists is the foundation of ethics, for Kantians is the negation of the... more
Thomists and Kantians usually ignore each other. And between Thomistic ethics and Kantian ethics there is the vast land of Metaphysics which divides them: what for Thomists is the foundation of ethics, for Kantians is the negation of the autonomy of ethics. Yet, both traditions seem to put the notion of person at the basis of normative ethics. A deeper understanding of the Kantian notion of will as the essential part of human nature would facilitate a third way, or a new route, out of the opposition between the two.
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An outline of Kant's philosophy of history, with an introductory commentary to the Idea of Universal History, sentence by sentence.
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An analysis of The Matrix, the movie by the Wachowski brothers, as elaborating an argument about the body as a virtual reality and about truth as the result of the discovery of freedom
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L'idea di giustizia di Amartya Sen è il tentativo di delineare una teoria della giustizia basata sulla comparazione fra diverse situazioni ed esigenze. Questo approccio, che Sen chiama "concezione incentrata sulle realizzazioni concrete",... more
L'idea di giustizia di Amartya Sen è il tentativo di delineare una teoria della giustizia basata sulla comparazione fra diverse situazioni ed esigenze. Questo approccio, che Sen chiama "concezione incentrata sulle realizzazioni concrete", si contrappone alla tradizione "incentrata sulla struttura", vale a dire alla prospettiva teorica tipica del contrattaualismo. La prospettiva di Sen ha molti meriti nel chiarire i limiti di una prospettiva procedurale basata esclusivamente sul profilo istituzionale di una società giusta. Ma non riesce a dimostrare il punto metodologico più profondo, ovvero la praticabilità, teorica prima che pratica, di una prospettiva in cui si sia rimosso ogni orizzonte trascendentale critico, a favore di una comparazione variabile a seconda degli attori coinvolti. Probabilmente, in realtà, Sen presuppone un tale orizzonte invece di dimostrarlo, criticando l'idea stessa di trascendentale. E finendo così per gettare il bambino con l'acqua sporca.
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Enhancing cognition is a complex activity, for the sake of which humanity has developed a rich array of techniques and skills, from education to mnemonic techniques and libraries. The recent availability of new pharmacological and... more
Enhancing cognition is a complex activity, for the sake of which humanity has developed a rich array of techniques and skills, from education to mnemonic techniques and libraries. The recent availability of new pharmacological and technological means of cognitive enhancement has raised a debate. We can distinguish between three categories: a) cognitive supports and education: the traditional means for enhancing (developing) cognitive abilities; b) neural cognitive enhancers: drugs and other ways to improve the functionality of cognitive neural networks in their biological status; c) technological cognitive enhancers: implants, extended minds and integrated systems (to the point of so-called singularity), as technological supports which are variously integrated in the autonomous functioning of neural cognitive networks. Applying a version of the Parity Principle, we can argue that there is no morally relevant difference in the three categories. What we want to preserve while using these techniques is not the biological status quo of the mind of persons. We rather want to protect personal identities as the result of the complex autonomous activity of moulding our physical abilities, our affective sensibilities and our cognitive powers. In this perspective, there can be no general objection to cognitive enhancement. Every technique, even very traditional ones, have their drawbacks, especially when they threaten to reduce the ability of autonomous agents to build up their own personal identity.
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The intersections between religion, ethics and politics depend quite strictly on the idea of authority. Apart from the classical weberian distinction between legal, traditional and charismatic authority, one can recall the difference... more
The intersections between religion, ethics and politics depend quite strictly on the idea of authority. Apart from the classical weberian distinction between legal, traditional and charismatic authority, one can recall the difference between epistemic and practical authority. The article shows that this distinction can be useful in two respects: first, in recalling the attempt, made by the Enlightenment thinkers, to found the authority of practical reason upon itself; second, trying to avoid the opposition between the authority of science and that of religion in fields such as bioehics. The notion of "autonomy of practical reason" can be of help to overcome such shortcomings.
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The most influential interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought in the last thirty years has been in terms of constructivism ; consequently, the Categorical Imperative has been interpreted as a procedure and the general metaethical... more
The most influential interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought in the last thirty years has been in terms of constructivism ; consequently, the Categorical Imperative has been interpreted as a procedure and the general metaethical perspective attitude among Kantians has been anti-realistic. In fact, Kant explicitly rejects attempts at grounding morality in anthropology (e.g. KrV B 869-870) or in sensible experience (MS, AA 6, 215, 217). Yet some scholars have recently challenged this interpretation , a number of thinkers of Kantian inclination in the recent past have tried to develop rather realistic frameworks for normative ethical theories and still others have criticized the presumed anti-naturalism of Kant’s thought in general .
Nonetheless, the appeal to the notion of nature is recurrent in many of Kant’s texts on ethics and it seems that, in a sense, a Kantian foundation of morality needs to define a meaning of nature which is connected with the basis of the normative power of practical reason and is implied in its structure. There is reason to think that the idea of natural law, which has been rather abandoned in the constructivistic interpretation, can be the starting point for a better interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought and for a consistent normative theory. In order to show the feasibility of this perspective I will first try to make clear the difference between the Kantian kind of appeal to nature and that implied, on the one hand, in contemporary «ethical naturalism» and, on the other, in traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic naturalism (classical naturalism). I will then take distance from the constructivistic interpretations of Kant’s ethical thought and try to show, rather briefly, the essential structure of what can be called a «realism of freedom», which is, I believe, the core of Kantian ethics. The idea of freedom as real and inscribed in the nature of practical reason is then recognized as the basis of morality, through the argument from the Fact of Reason.
Nonetheless, the appeal to the notion of nature is recurrent in many of Kant’s texts on ethics and it seems that, in a sense, a Kantian foundation of morality needs to define a meaning of nature which is connected with the basis of the normative power of practical reason and is implied in its structure. There is reason to think that the idea of natural law, which has been rather abandoned in the constructivistic interpretation, can be the starting point for a better interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought and for a consistent normative theory. In order to show the feasibility of this perspective I will first try to make clear the difference between the Kantian kind of appeal to nature and that implied, on the one hand, in contemporary «ethical naturalism» and, on the other, in traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic naturalism (classical naturalism). I will then take distance from the constructivistic interpretations of Kant’s ethical thought and try to show, rather briefly, the essential structure of what can be called a «realism of freedom», which is, I believe, the core of Kantian ethics. The idea of freedom as real and inscribed in the nature of practical reason is then recognized as the basis of morality, through the argument from the Fact of Reason.
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The most influential interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought in the last thirty years has been in terms of constructivism ; consequently, the Categorical Imperative has been interpreted as a procedure and the general metaethical... more
The most influential interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought in the last thirty years has been in terms of constructivism ; consequently, the Categorical Imperative has been interpreted as a procedure and the general metaethical perspective attitude among Kantians has been anti-realistic. In fact, Kant explicitly rejects attempts at grounding morality in anthropology (e.g. KrV B 869-870) or in sensible experience (MS, AA 6, 215, 217). Yet some scholars have recently challenged this interpretation , a number of thinkers of Kantian inclination in the recent past have tried to develop rather realistic frameworks for normative ethical theories and still others have criticized the presumed anti-naturalism of Kant’s thought in general .
Nonetheless, the appeal to the notion of nature is recurrent in many of Kant’s texts on ethics and it seems that, in a sense, a Kantian foundation of morality needs to define a meaning of nature which is connected with the basis of the normative power of practical reason and is implied in its structure. There is reason to think that the idea of natural law, which has been rather abandoned in the constructivistic interpretation, can be the starting point for a better interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought and for a consistent normative theory. In order to show the feasibility of this perspective I will first try to make clear the difference between the Kantian kind of appeal to nature and that implied, on the one hand, in contemporary «ethical naturalism» and, on the other, in traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic naturalism (classical naturalism). I will then take distance from the constructivistic interpretations of Kant’s ethical thought and try to show, rather briefly, the essential structure of what can be called a «realism of freedom», which is, I believe, the core of Kantian ethics. The idea of freedom as real and inscribed in the nature of practical reason is then recognized as the basis of morality, through the argument from the Fact of Reason.
Nonetheless, the appeal to the notion of nature is recurrent in many of Kant’s texts on ethics and it seems that, in a sense, a Kantian foundation of morality needs to define a meaning of nature which is connected with the basis of the normative power of practical reason and is implied in its structure. There is reason to think that the idea of natural law, which has been rather abandoned in the constructivistic interpretation, can be the starting point for a better interpretation of Kant’s ethical thought and for a consistent normative theory. In order to show the feasibility of this perspective I will first try to make clear the difference between the Kantian kind of appeal to nature and that implied, on the one hand, in contemporary «ethical naturalism» and, on the other, in traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic naturalism (classical naturalism). I will then take distance from the constructivistic interpretations of Kant’s ethical thought and try to show, rather briefly, the essential structure of what can be called a «realism of freedom», which is, I believe, the core of Kantian ethics. The idea of freedom as real and inscribed in the nature of practical reason is then recognized as the basis of morality, through the argument from the Fact of Reason.
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... Sono altresì grato alla sig.ra Cristina Robbiati, segretaria del Dipartimento, per il paziente lavoro 15 Page 18. di trascrizione dei documenti e alla dottoressa Gloria Cattaneo per la revisione di quest'ultimi. Infine,... more
... Sono altresì grato alla sig.ra Cristina Robbiati, segretaria del Dipartimento, per il paziente lavoro 15 Page 18. di trascrizione dei documenti e alla dottoressa Gloria Cattaneo per la revisione di quest'ultimi. Infine, desidero ringraziare mia moglie Anna, per avermi affettuo ...
One might assume that just as grocers know what they mean by groceries, so health care providers surely must have a dear concept of health in mind when they use this great word. Health is one of those everyday slippery-as-mercury words,... more
One might assume that just as grocers know what they mean by groceries, so health care providers surely must have a dear concept of health in mind when they use this great word. Health is one of those everyday slippery-as-mercury words, the meaning of which seems so obvious ...
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Chapter 9 RECOGNITION AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS A Personalistic Interpretation of Kant's Categorical Imperative ROBERTO MORDACCI Milan, Italy La fin de 1'inquierude, c'est la fin de la moralite, et de la vie... more
Chapter 9 RECOGNITION AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS A Personalistic Interpretation of Kant's Categorical Imperative ROBERTO MORDACCI Milan, Italy La fin de 1'inquierude, c'est la fin de la moralite, et de la vie personnelle. E. Mourner, Lepersonnalisme, 1950 The ...
Prefazione Questo saggio svolge un'analisi critica delle principali teorie morali impegnate nel dibattito filosofico sui più importanti pro-blemi bioetici. L'attenzione è rivolta più alle teorie normative e ai loro... more
Prefazione Questo saggio svolge un'analisi critica delle principali teorie morali impegnate nel dibattito filosofico sui più importanti pro-blemi bioetici. L'attenzione è rivolta più alle teorie normative e ai loro presupposti che alle questioni bioetiche in quanto tali. Ciascuna di queste ultime ...
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Genetic information plays an increasingly important role in ourlives. As a result of the Human Genome Project, knowledge ofthe genetic basis of various diseases is growing, withimportant consequences for the role of genetics in... more
Genetic information plays an increasingly important role in ourlives. As a result of the Human Genome Project, knowledge ofthe genetic basis of various diseases is growing, withimportant consequences for the role of genetics in clinicalpractice, health care systems and for ...
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Ragion pratica ISSN : 1720-2396. Numero: 1, giugno 2003, Indice. DOI: 10.1415/9120. Ragionevoli motivazioni. La normatività dei principi morali secondo Thomas Scanlon Roberto Mordacci, pp. 11-32 6 [pdf 499K ...
... | Ayuda. Realismo e liberalismo. Autores: Roberto Mordacci; Localización: Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, ISSN 1591-0660, Nº. 1, 2001 , pags. 259-268. © 2001-2009 Universidad de La Rioja · Todos los derechos reservados. XHTML 1.0;... more
... | Ayuda. Realismo e liberalismo. Autores: Roberto Mordacci; Localización: Filosofia e questioni pubbliche, ISSN 1591-0660, Nº. 1, 2001 , pags. 259-268. © 2001-2009 Universidad de La Rioja · Todos los derechos reservados. XHTML 1.0; UTF‑8.
Presentazione di "Foucault and the Making of Subjects" (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, edited by Laura Cremonesi, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli). I co-editori Laura Cremonesi (Università di Pisa) e Orazio Irrera... more
Presentazione di "Foucault and the Making of Subjects" (Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, edited by Laura Cremonesi, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini and Martina Tazzioli).
I co-editori Laura Cremonesi (Università di Pisa) e Orazio Irrera (Université Paris 8; Collège International de Philosophie) discuteranno con il prof. Roberto Mordacci e Antonio Moretti.
I co-editori Laura Cremonesi (Università di Pisa) e Orazio Irrera (Université Paris 8; Collège International de Philosophie) discuteranno con il prof. Roberto Mordacci e Antonio Moretti.
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Nel tentativo di rispondere alle questioni ultime del nostro stare al mondo, possiamo dirci ancora ‘moderni’? Una risposta positiva non è affatto scontata. Parte della filosofia del Novecento risponde di no: morte del soggetto, fine delle... more
Nel tentativo di rispondere alle questioni ultime del nostro stare al mondo, possiamo dirci ancora ‘moderni’? Una risposta positiva non è affatto scontata. Parte della filosofia del Novecento risponde di no: morte del soggetto, fine delle grandi narrazioni, nichilismo, post-verità compongono una categoria, quella di post-modernità, che è da subito una dichiarazione d’intenti. La risposta alla crisi però deve passare per forza attraverso la rinuncia alla domanda sul senso? La sfida di questo numero sta proprio qui: e se fosse giunto il momento di dissotterrare alcune delle grandi questioni – la verità, il soggetto, il senso della storia – che il post-moderno aveva provato a seppellire? Se fosse giunta l’ora di dirci, di nuovo, ‘moderni’?